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Distributive Justice and Political Ideologies 
A Reply to Volacu 
 
VALENTIN STOIAN 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
  
Political theory and real-world politics have had a sometimes tenuous 
relationship. Caught in the web of abstract theorizing, political philosophers 
chose to withdraw from real world politics and to relate to one another strictly 
according to philosophical lines. Alternatively, real world politicians are daily 
confronted with hard political choices to make, compromises to decide upon 
and power struggles to contend. While these two worlds have gradually moved 
apart, only few political theorists have attempted engaging with the world of 
day-to-day politics. 
This engagement is necessary since political theory risks losing its 
relevance if it chooses to withdraw from a dialogue with politics. Aimed to be 
not just a study of politics, but to generate action-guiding principles of political 
justice, political theory must take into account the developments occurring in 
real-world politics if it seeks to remain relevant. 
One way in which some political theorists chose to undertake this task 
is to engage the topic of just institutions in their work. Authors such as O’Neill1, 
Williamson2, Alperovitz3, Tomasi4 and Penny5 work at lower level of 
abstraction than the classics of political theory and engage the issue of how 
principles of justice can translate into institutions. Alternatively, they employed 
                                                 
1
  Martin O’Neill, “Free (and Fair) Markets Without Capitalism: Political Values, Principles 
of Justice and Property-Owning Democracy”, in Martin O’Neill, Thad Williamson (eds.) 
Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2012; 
Martin O’Neill “Liberty, Equality and Property-Owning Democracy”, Journal of Social 
Philosophy, vol. 40, issue 3, Fall 2009, pp. 379-396. 
2
  Thad Williamson, “Is Property-Owning Democracy a Politically Viable Aspiration?”, in 
Martin O’neill, Thad Williamson (eds.) Property-Owning Democracy...cit. 
3
  Gar Alperovitz, “The Pluralist Commonwealth and Property-Owning Democracy”, in 
Martin O’Neill, Thad Williamson (eds.) Property-Owning Democracy...cit. 
4
  John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2012.  
5
  Richard Penny, “Self-Respect or Self-Delusion? Tomasi and Rawls on the Basic 
Liberties”, Res Publica, vol. 21, issue 4, 2015, pp 397-411; Richard Penny, “Incentives, 
Inequality and Self-Respect”, Res Publica, vol. 19, issue 4, November 2013, pp 335-351. 
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their work and entered into a debate with economists on this topic. The best 
example is Martin O’Neill’s participation in the Crooked Timber seminar 
discussing Piketty’s6 work.  
A Romanian example of such work is Alexandru Volacu’s7 work on the 
relation between the concept of distributive justice and several political 
ideologies. A salutary article, Volacu’s paper makes a necessary connection 
between political science and political theory. Volacu extracts the main 
characteristics of the normative ideal of distributive justice and compares them 
to different political ideologies as synthesized in a book edited by Mihaela 
Miroiu and the platforms of Europarties or American political parties. Volacu 
establishes three possible relations between the concept of distributive justice and 
different political ideologies: incompatibility, compatibility and implication. He 
then proceeds to argue that distributive justice is incompatible with many 
political ideologies (monist political ideologies, anarchism, conservatism, 
socialism in its Marxist form) and that it is compatible with anarchism, feminism 
and cosmopolitanism. Finally, Volacu argues that only social democracy is 
required by distributive justice and makes his point with a reference to the 
political platform of the S&D political group in the European Parliament. 
This paper aims to critique Volacu’s work and to argue three claims: 
that he 1. misuses the term distributive justice and that 2. Due to this misuse he 
incorrectly chooses his units of comparison and that 3. He unfairly characterizes 
the European Left Party’s platform as a holist form of communism, owing to his 
use of common tropes in anti-Marxist literature. It will do so by analyzing 
Volacu’s view on the notion of distributive justice and by distinguishing 
between distributive justice and theories of distributive justice.  
The first section presents an analysis of how Volacu understands the 
term distributive justice and argues that he is misled by the definition he 
employs. Moreover, this section also discusses the difference between patterns 
of distributive justice and principles of justice and argues that Volacu uses the 
first where he should have used the second. It shows that distributive justice is 
not a concept, but a field of philosophical investigation and that political 
ideologies should be compared with individual theories of justice. Then, in the 
second section, I analyze the difference between the debate on distributive 
justice and political obligation and argue that Volacu’s comparison of 
distributive justice with anarchism is mistaken as they are simply fish from 
different ponds. The third section provides an analysis of Volacu’s 
methodology of comparison, and the results are used to buttress the argument 
from the fourth section, where I affirm that Volacu’s claim that the European 
                                                 
6
  Martin O’Neill, Piketty, Meade and Predistribution, 17.12.2015, http://crookedtimber. 
org/ 2015/12/17/piketty-meade-and-predistribution/, accessed 20.02.2016  
7
  Alexandru Volacu „On the Ideological Incompatibilities of Distributive Justice”, Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2015, pp. 109-132. 
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Left Platform manifesto is a holist Marxist document is unfair and misleading, 
yet provide some background to the intellectual debates which lead him to make 
this argument. I conclude that Marxism as both an ideology and as theory of 
distributive justice are unclear, but if the ELP manifesto is an exemplar of 
Marxism, then Volacu’s criticism falls short of fairness and relevance.  
 
 
Distributive Justice: Defining the Playing Field.  
Patterns and Principles 
  
Volacu’s understanding of distributive justice is marred by two internal 
confusions which require clarification before one can proceed further. The first 
confusion is that between distributive justice and theories of distributive justice 
and the second between patterns and principles of distribution. The first 
contradiction presupposes that Volacu employs the definition of a theory of 
distributive justice to describe the concept of distributive justice. Secondly, 
relying on Nozick, Volacu  misreads the term patterns in the expression 
“patterned principles” of distributive justice which leads him to further muddy 
the waters. 
The first confusion that Volacu makes is that between the concept of 
distributive justice and a theory of distributive justice. According to him, a 
definition of distributive justice is “justice in setting A demands that B be 
distributed to C according to some pattern D, constrained by conditions of type 
E”8. He further elaborates the definition to explain that A is “the state, the 
community, the basic structure, the family, the world”9. The definition quoted 
above correctly identifies A as the site of distributive justice. The site of 
distributive justice has been understood in the literature as the institutions that 
need to be held at the bar of justice, such as the basic structure, personal 
relations. According to Cohen this is “a site at which principles of justice 
apply”10 while according to Abizadeh’s fuller definition, it is the kinds of 
objects (individuals' actions, individuals' character, rules, or institutions, and so 
on) appropriately governed by principles of justice)11. Yet, Volacu muddies the 
water by including objects such as “the world” or “the community” in his 
instantiation of A. This leads to a potential confusion between the site, which 
properly belongs under A in this enumeration and the scope, represented by C 
                                                 
8
  Ibidem, p. 110. 
9
  Ibidem, p. 112.  
10
  G.A. Cohen, “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice”, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, vol. 26, no. 1, Winter, 1997, pp. 3-30. 
11  Arash Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope of 
Distributive Justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol 35, no. 4, 2007, pp 318-358. 
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in the definition. The scope of distributive justice is, also according to 
Abizadeh12, the “range of persons who have claims upon and responsibilities to 
each other arising from considerations of justice”. 
B represents the “currency” of distributive justice, or the thing to be 
distributed. Volacu then proceeds to define C as “the agents which are eligible 
for benefiting from the proposed pattern of distribution”. This properly 
represents the scope of distributive justice. Finally, D and E are quite clear, as 
they establish the rule according to which a set of goods should be distributed 
and the constraints upon the theory. 
Thus, in Volacu’s view, a theory of distributive justice contains 
information about the following: the site, the currency, the scope, the principle 
of distribution and the restrictions to which it is subject. This is a correct and 
accurate description of a complete and comprehensive theory of justice. Rawls’ 
theory, the most well-known in the literature includes information on the site 
(the basic structure, in a relatively limited form), the currency (primary goods), 
the scope (the national community, people who are under the same coercive 
institutions) and the principle (the two principles of justice). No restrictions are 
evident in Rawls’ theory. Alternatively, Dworkin does not include information 
about the site or scope), but about currency (external and internal resources) and 
pattern (what comes out of an idealized market which includes insurance 
trading). G.A. Cohen is less clear, but he at least includes information about the 
currency (welfare) and pattern (strict egalitarianism or at least a much extended 
version of the difference principle) and site (a wide understanding of the basic 
structure13 (Cohen, 2008). 
Yet, while this is all true, Volacu confuses the definition of a theory of 
distributive justice with the concept itself. The definition above properly 
explains what a theory is, but does not say anything about what distributive 
justice is. If a theory of something is a set of sentences about that something, 
then theories of distributive justice speak about their object, without necessarily 
defining it. Two other definitions of distributive justice do nothing but make 
things even more complicated. According to Michelle Maiese “distributive 
justice is concerned with the fair allocation of resources among diverse 
members of a community”14 while in the view of the Internet Encyplopedia of 
Philosophy (IEP, Distributive justice) “Theories of distributive justice seek to 
specify what is meant by a just distribution of goods among members of 
                                                 
12
  Ibidem. 
13
  G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Masssachusets, 2008, p 120.  
14
  Michelle Maiese, “Distributive Justice”, June 2013, http://www.beyondintractability.org/ 
essay/distributive-justice, accessed 20.02.2016. 
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society”15. The Stanford encyclopedia does somewhat better in attempting to 
define distributive justice:  
 
 “The economic framework that each society has — its laws, institutions, 
policies, etc. — results in different distributions of economic benefits and burdens 
across members of the society [...] Arguments about which  frameworks and/or resulting 
distributions are morally preferable constitute the topic of distributive justice”16. 
 
In the view of this paper, the Stanford definition should be adopted as 
the understanding of what distributive justice is. Distributive justice is a field of 
philosophical (as opposed to scientific) investigation (akin to metaphysics but, 
despite its institutional placement- that is, in political science departments, 
dissimilar from political science proper) in which the competing theories tell us 
something about how primordially economic (as opposed to purely political), 
benefits and burdens, produced by a framework should be distributed (benefits) 
or shared (burdens). The framework element is necessary, as the problem 
investigated does not emerge outside human interaction of any kind: a group of 
Robinson Crusoes do not require distributive justice. 
Thus, as a field of philosophical investigation, it is rather difficult to 
compare distributive justice with any ideology whatsoever. The best 
comparison should then be between individual theories of distributive justice 
and individual ideologies. To give one example, I would intuitively associate 
Right-wing Rawlsianism (John Tomasi, Kevin Vallier) with classical liberalism, 
the mainstream Rawlsian view with social democracy and the left-wing 
Rawlsians (Martin O’Neill) with a position more akin to that of democratic 
socialism as that attempted by Clement Attlee and revived by Jeremy Corbyn. 
Having thus established the terms, one can further proceed to discuss 
Volacu’s reading of Nozick and even Nozick himself. If one accepts that 
distributive justice is a field of philosophical investigation populated by 
competing theories, then excluding Nozick’s libertarianism would be 
implausible. However, if one started from the same definition as Volacu, which 
confounds distributive justice with any specific theory of it, then the exclusion 
of libertarianism would be a foregone conclusion. In what follows, I shall muse 
on Nozick’s reading of two crucial terms in the field and explain why Nozick’s 
theory is indeed a theory of (distributive) justice. 
Volacu correctly points out to Nozick’s two main criticims of the 
theories of justice prevalent at the time: distribution by the state and patterning. 
He employs these two characteristics of Nozick’s critique to argue that it 
                                                 
15
  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Distributive Justice”, http://plato.stanford.edu 
/entries/justice-distributive/, 2013, accessed 20.02.2016  
16
  Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Distributive Justice”, http://www.iep.utm.edu/dist-
jus/, accessed 20.02.2016. 
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disqualifies libertarian theories from being included in distributive justice, as 
the latter requires both a central (re)distributive authority and a pattern. 
However, terminological confusions beset Nozick, probably caused by the fact 
that the field of distributive justice was in its infancy when he wrote Anarchy, 
State and Utopia. 
The first terminological confusion that Nozick commits and which is 
taken over by Volacu is to understand the term distributive in the construction 
distributive justice as requiring that something should be distributed to someone 
by someone else. Volacu uses this quote from Nozick to prove his point. 
 
“Hearing the term ‘distribution’, most people presume that some thing or 
mechanism uses some principle or criterion to give out a supply of things. [...] 
However, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions of pie by 
someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless cutting. There is no 
central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly 
deciding how they are to be doled out”17 (Nozick, 1974 quoted in Volacu, 2015). 
 
According to Nozick, distributive justice is offensive because it 
presupposes that a person, or a group of people distributes common resources to 
others. It would not matter for Nozick if all members of the community would 
jointly and democratically distribute communal resources to everyone. What 
matters to him is that a central authority that has any power over resources 
exists at all. To this view, he opposes a fierce individualism based on justice in 
transfer and justice in acquisition. 
Alternatively, according to my reading of the term distributive justice as 
a field of philosophical inquiry, the essential meaning of the term “distributive” 
does not require the currency of justice to be distributed to someone by 
someone else. The relevant meaning of the term distributive justice is that the 
end result is a distribution of burdens and benefits according to a morally 
relevant rule. The mechanism by which this distribution is achieved is 
irrelevant to whether any specific theory qualifies as a theory of distributive 
justice. If a theory presupposes an absolutely free market of the type that 
Nozick envisions as the best mechanism of distribution, this does not disqualify 
it as a theory of distributive justice. The only kinds of theories to be refused the 
denomination of theories of distributive justice (more because they refuse any 
type of justice than any type of distribution) are those that deny moral equal 
status to all humans and those that accept that in economic distribution “might 
makes right” i.e. those who refuse to make any moral statements. 
Secondly, Nozick criticizes theories of distributive justice on account of 
them being patterned i.e. linking distribution with some “natural dimension, 
                                                 
17
  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1974, p. 150 
quoted in Alexandru Volacu  “On the Ideological Incompatibilities...cit.”. 
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weighted sum of natural dimensions or lexicographic order of natural 
dimensions”18. Yet, what Nozick does not realize and what leads Volacu astray 
is that patterning is not a necessary characteristic of a theory of distributive 
justice. Alternatively, as mentioned above, the crucial aspect of a theory of 
distributive justice is that it specifies some morally relevant rule (let’s call it 
principle) according to which distributional end-states should be judged. If one 
was to modify the definition above to state: a theory of distributive justice is a 
coherent set of claims about how and why justice in setting A demands that B be 
distributed to C according to some morally relevant rule/principle D, 
constrained by conditions of type E, then one could not say the essence of what 
theories of distributive justice is would be at all lost. Nozick would have little to 
complain if someone were to tell him that his three principles (justice in 
acquisition, justice in transfer, justice in rectification) are morally relevant rules 
and that, despite the fact that it prohibits a central authority distributing things 
to people, his theory belongs to the philosophical field of distributive justice. 
To distinguish between patterns and principles, one could show that all 
patterns of distributive justice are also principles, but not all principles are all 
patterns. Thus, the set of patterns is included in that of principles. Patterns of 
distributive justice are principles of distribution tied to natural dimensions (such 
as merit, or, why not, height), while principles are simply relevant statements 
about how goods and benefits should be distributed.  
To recapitulate, in my view, distributive justice is a philosophical field 
of inquiry (compare it to a pond, filled with competing fish), where the main 
stakes of debate are the rule, the currency and the set of people to which 
primordially economic resources are distributed by a social mechanism (not 
necessarily by someone). It is populated by competing theories offering 
different answers to this question and which attempt to defeat each other. 
Theories excluded from this field are non-normative theories (those that try to 
explain how and why the world is) and theories which reject morality whatsoever. 
 
 
Distributive Justice and Political Obligation: 
Different Ponds with Different Fish  
 
One of the first comparisons Volacu undertakes is between his view of 
distributive justice and anarchism. He argues that since distributive justice 
presupposes patterns, while anarchism argues “that all forms of human 
association must be voluntary”19, the latter is excluded. As seen above, the use 
                                                 
18
  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State...cit., p. 156.  
19
  Valentin Quintus Nicolescu, “Anarhismul”, în Mihaela Miroiu (coord.) Ideologii politice 
actuale, Polirom, Iași, 2012, pp. 301-321.  
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of the term patterns is ambiguous and its application for principles of 
distributive justice leads to even more confusion. The confusion is further 
compounded by the use of the term “voluntary” in this association and the 
apparent strong contradiction between voluntariness and patterns. Yet, having 
cleared the way, and presented a clearer picture of distributive justice as a 
distinct field of philosophical inquiry, one can now place anarchism as both a 
philosophical conception and as a political ideology in their proper place. 
In this section, I argue, relying on a summary presentation of A.J. 
Simmons’ work that debates on distributive justice have nothing to do with 
anarchism. One cannot even compare any theory of distributive justice with any 
anarchism as they do not play in the same field. Further, I also believe that all 
theories of distributive justice (Nozick’s included) presuppose the existence of a 
coercive state and that this is why anarchism as an ideology is left outside the 
scope of distributive justice as a field of inquiry. 
Anarchism, both as a theory of political philosophy20 and as an ideology 
belongs to a wholly different field of philosophical debate (imagine that they 
are different ponds, populated by very different fish), where it confronts 
different competing theories. While distributive justice asks “How should 
primordially economic benefits be distributed?”, theories in the political 
obligation “pond” attempt to answer a very different question, that is “Why 
should I obey the law?”. In this particular pond, anarchism’s competing fish are 
Lockean and neo-Lockean consent theories21 late Rawls’ natural duty of 
justice22, early Rawls’ duty of fair play23, Walker’s theory of gratitude24 and 
Dworkin’s associative political obligation25. Finally, I also claim (although I 
shall not pursue the argument in detail here) that the answer to the question 
posed in the political obligation pond must be answered before providing a 
coherent attempt at a theory of distributive justice. In other words, I believe 
that, since any theory of distributive justice presupposes a state and that this 
state must be legitimate, the debate on political obligation is anterior to that on 
distributive justice. 
                                                 
20
  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Political Obligation, August 2014, 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/#ConThePolObl, accessed 20.02.2016. 
21
  Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2003. 
22
  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Masssachusets, 1999, p. 334.  
23
  Idem, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play”, in , S. Hook (ed.), Law and 
Philosophy, New York University Press, New York, 1964, pp. 117-129.  
24
  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Political Obligation, August 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/#ConThePolObl, accessed 20.02.2016  
25
  Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 2011; Idem, Law's Empire, Mass: Belknap Press, Cambridge, 
1986; A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; Valentin Stoian “Dworkin’s Associative 
Political Obligations and the Anarchist Challenge”, Annals of the University of Bucharest-
Philosophy,  Series 61, no. 1, 2012, pp. 99-107. 
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Having established the fields in which different theories play, I would 
like to give a brief summary of anarchism as political philosophy and of its 
brief, but intense life as a political ideology. I believe that, unlike in many 
cases, where theories of distributive justice are only with difficulty translated 
into political ideologies, philosophical anarchism is one where similarities 
between the philosophy and the ideology are great and the differences lie only 
in the prescribed action. 
Philosophical anarchism has been best expounded by Robert Paul Wolff, 
who, in his essay “In Defense of Anarchism”26 argued that political authority is 
incompatible with individual autonomy. According to his view, one person or 
institution has authority if it has a “right to be obeyed”. This means that a person 
who has authority has a moral claim to the obedience of others ( as opposed to a 
claim based on power) and that the latter have a moral duty to obey the person 
in authority. Alternatively, autonomy involves a person taking responsibility for 
his own actions and doing only the things he can provide himself with a rational 
reason to do (for example, obeying one’s doctor because he has superior 
expertise on a particular topic, but not because he is one’s doctor)27. 
When putting the two concepts together, Wolff concludes that: 
 
“The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary 
obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem, then, that there 
can be no resolution of the conflict between the autonomy of the individual and the 
putative authority of the state. Insofar as a man fulfills his obligation to make himself 
the author of his decisions, he will resist the state's claim to have authority over him. 
That is to say, he will deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply 
because they are the laws. In that sense, it would seem that anarchism is the only 
political doctrine consistent with the virtue of autonomy”28.  
 
A less powerful form of philosophical anarchism is that which does not 
deny that a theory of political obligation is possible but only claims that no 
coherent theory has succeeded until now to provide compelling reason for the 
existence of political obligation. This line of argument establishes three 
conditions (generality, particularity and content-independence) for a theory of 
political obligation to succeed and then holds existing theories to this standard, 
concluding that they fail to satisfy these conditions. The generality condition 
claims that a theory of political obligation must provide a justification to a 
citizen to obey all laws issued by a state (not just some). The particularity 
condition argues that a successful theory of political obligation must account for 
a citizen being obligated to a particular state (not to, i.e. just states in general). 
Finally, the content-independence condition claims that such a theory should 
                                                 
26
  Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, 3rd edition, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1970. 
27
  Ibidem. 
28
  Ibidem. 
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offer a reason why a citizen must obey a law because it has been issued by a 
specific authority and not because it contains certain moral provisions29. 
However, unlike ideological anarchists, those of a philosophical sort 
accept that while there is no moral duty to obey the law because it is the law30 
there is no content-independent obligation) there are plenty of content-
dependent obligations, most of which are transcribed in existing laws. Thus, 
there is an obligation not to kill people (due to our common moral status) and 
not to steal legitimate property (philosophical anarchists have not grappled with 
a theory of legitimate property, but do not deny such a possibility exist). 
However, philosophical anarchists have not discussed such cases of 
embezzlement or tax evasion, where the only victim is the state whose 
legitimacy they deny. Thus, what philosophical anarchists believe is that non-
violent political action should lead us to a world without states and that only in 
such a world political interactions would be truly voluntary. Wolff imagines a 
world of small voluntary communities, in which all national defense and 
economic coordination rely on each interaction being completely voluntary and 
relatively localized, despite the large costs associated with such a society31. 
Another difference between philosophical and ideological ones is that 
the latter do not accept content-dependent obligations and advocate for the 
violent overthrow of the state, or, in less extreme circumstances, for a complete 
withdrawal from interactions with states and the creation of voluntary 
communes (only there, would they argue that content-dependent moral 
obligations can have force). Ideological anarchists have not provided any moral 
theory, but a simple reading of their work through the philosophical lenses of 
today provide the following reading: general moral duties can be overridden in 
the revolutionary struggle for establishing an anarchist community, but after the 
state has been overthrown, they will be re-instated voluntarily. This argument 
can be supported by a necessarily brief perusal of two key anarchist texts: 
Mikhail Bakunin’s God and the State and Revolutionary Catechism and Sergey 
Nechayev’s Catechism of a Revolutionary. 
Bakunin argues for the denial of political authority in the following passage: 
 
 “In a word, we reject all legislation, all authority, and all privileged, licensed, 
official, and legal influence,  even though arising from universal suffrage, convinced 
that it can turn only to the advantage of a dominant minority of exploiters against the 
interests of the immense majority in subjection to them”32  
 
                                                 
29
  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Political Obligation, August 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/#ConThePolObl, accessed 20.02.2016. 
30
  George Klosko, “Are Political Obligations Content Independent?”, Political Theory, vol. 
39 no. 4, August 2011, pp. 498-523. 
31
  Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, cit. 
32
  Mikhail Bakunin God and the State, 1871, https://www.marxists.org/ 
reference/archive/bakunin/works/godstate/, accessed 20.02.2016.  
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Similarly to Wolff, Bakunin accepts the expertise argument for 
authority, claiming that in specific and limited circumstances, those who know a 
field better can have authority, based on their superior experience. Yet, this does 
not give rise to a general obligation to obey the law: 
 
 “Does it follow that I reject all authority? Far from me such a thought. In the 
matter of boots, I refer to the  authority  of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or 
railroads, I consult that of the architect or engineer. For such or such special knowledge 
I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect 
 nor the savant to impose his authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the 
respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always 
my incontestable right of criticism censure. […] If I bow before the authority of the 
specialists and avow my readiness to follow, to a certain extent and as long as may seem 
to me necessary, their indications and even their directions, it is because their authority 
is imposed upon me by no one, neither by men nor by God”33  
 
Finally, in his Revolutionary Catechism, Bakunin argues that a non-state 
association of people is the only one where content-dependent obligations can 
be made law by a common assembly: 
 
 “Man is truly free only among equally free men; the slavery of even one 
human being violates humanity and negates the freedom of all […] Absolute rejection 
of every authority including that which sacrifices freedom  for the convenience of the 
 state.[…] The political and economic structure of society must now be reorganized on 
 the basis of freedom. Henceforth, order in society must result from the greatest possible 
realization of individual liberty, as well as of liberty on all levels of social 
organization”34. 
 “The political and economic organization of social life must not, as at present, 
be directed from the summit to the base – the center to the circumference – imposing 
 unity through forced centralization. On the  contrary, it must be reorganized to 
issue from the base to the summit – from the circumference to the center – 
 according to the principles of free association and federation”35. 
 
Sergey Nechayev argues for violently overthrowing the state, relying on 
the idea that there can be no human community as long as the state is still 
standing: 
 
 “The nature of the true revolutionary excludes all sentimentality, 
romanticism, infatuation, and exaltation. All private hatred and revenge must also be 
excluded. Revolutionary passion, practiced at every moment of the day until it becomes 
a habit, is to be employed with cold calculation. 
The revolutionary enters the world of the State, of the privileged classes, of the 
so-called civilization, and he lives in this world only for the purpose of bringing about 
                                                 
33  Ibidem. 
34
  Mikhail Bakunin, Revolutionary Catechism, 1866, https://www.marxists.org/reference/ 
archive/bakunin/works/1866/catechism.htm, accessed 20.02.2016. 
35
  Ibidem. 
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its speedy and total destruction. He is not a revolutionary if he has any sympathy for 
this world. He should not hesitate to destroy any position, any place, or any man in this 
world. He must hate everyone and everything in it with an equal hatred. All the worse 
for him if he has any relations with parents, friends, or lovers; he is no longer a 
revolutionary if he is swayed by these relationships”36. 
 
 
Comparison and Restriction 
  
In order to establish a relationship between each ideology and the 
concept of distributive justice, Volacu undertakes an absolutely necessary work 
of simplification. He extracts the core from each of these concepts and 
compares these cores against each other, verifying their compatibility. As he 
himself mentions, this is a “Sisyphean task”, which is limited by “spatial 
constraints and the vastness of the literature on both distributive justice and 
political ideologies” and beset by a tradeoff between a limited “possibility of a 
more thorough examination of the implications of each element of distributive 
justice on ideologies” and “the provision of a broad, albeit thin, overview of all 
major salient contemporary ideologies in relation to distributive justice”37. 
I argue that this methodology is an acceptable way to proceed as long as 
each restriction is 1. Justified 2. Crucial and 3. Fair. We can imagine each 
political ideology as having a core and an outer shell. Restricting each of these 
to create entities comparable within an academic article involves removing the 
outer shell and keeping only the core in the comparison. Given that the space 
offered by an academic article is restricted and that the author sets himself an 
ambitious task, the restrictions that Volacu operates with are also rather large. A 
significant amount of the outer shell has to be discarded and only a very small 
core remains to be compared. In order to obtain objects that are worthy of 
comparison, a strict adherence to the three principles mentioned above is crucial. 
The first principle that, I believe, such a restriction needs to operate 
with, is that of being justified. In other words, all the elements of each 
comparandum that need to be there, are kept in the comparable core. No 
relevant element is missed and the relationship between each of the core 
elements is well-established. The second principle that this comparison needs to 
fulfill is that of being crucial: only the relevant elements are kept in the 
comparable core and no irrelevant element enters. For each ideology, at least 
the main tenets have to remain, such as the grounding conception of human 
moral status, the foundation of political authority, its scope and its ultimate 
goal. Moreover, no unnecessary elements should be added. 
                                                 
36
  Sergey Nechayev The Revolutionary Catechism, 1869, https://www.marxists.org/ 
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The third principle of restriction is that of fairness. It argues that all 
ideologies need to be reduced to their core fairly. A person attempting Volacu’s 
comparison should not make a straw man out of a particular ideology while 
keeping attractive parts of another. For example, one could dislike conservatism 
and present only its negative implications, while liking social democracy and 
demonstrating its most positive sides. The comparable core of each ideology 
should be based on a fair mix of appealing and un-appealing elements. Further, 
the clarification of each element should be done in the best spirit of the ideology 
rather than in a way to negatively or positively affect one or another. For 
example, if two different ideologies (let’s say conservatism and social 
democracy) speak of “fairness” as a crucial value, one needs to interpret what 
fairness means for each of these in the light of other elements of the comparable 
core. Thus, one will certainly find that “conservative fairness” is different from 
“social- democratic fairness”, the first referring to a fair market, while the 
second to a fair ex post (after the market has run its course) distribution of 
income and wealth. Further, the relative weight of each value differs in each 
ideology, complicating the attempted restriction even further. Yet, as long as the 
same procedure is applied to each ideology in turn, one can reach acceptable 
cores for each of these ideologies. Further, one can also accept that the primary 
sources (the platforms of Europarties and of American political parties) Volacu 
employs in order to obtain the cores for each ideology are acceptable, as they 
represent the best possible simplified option. 
 
 
Marxism and Justice 
 
In this section I criticize Volacu’s approach to Marxism, resulting in 
claim that Marxism is incompatible with distributive justice. I argue, based on 
the principles of restriction defended above, that his construal of Marxism 
grossly violates the principle of being crucial and, to a lesser extent that of 
being justified. Accusing Volacu’s restriction of Marxism of unfairness would 
be unfair by itself, as I do not think it was done with the goal of excluding 
Marxism from the scope of comparable ideologies. Yet, I also offer a very brief 
presentation of the main tropes in the anti-Marxist literature which serve as an 
inspiration for such restrictions.  
As an epitome of neo-communist ideology, Volacu analyzes the 
platform of the party of the European left and correctly argues that it presents a 
rather “blurry vision of what socialism is”38, alternating old socialist values such 
as economic equality, with new views which include anti-globalization, third 
world issues, environmentalism, gender issues and the critique of the EU’s 
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democratic deficit Yet, despite the impressive array of democratic values 
espoused by the Manifesto, Volacu focuses on a single sentence at the end of 
the program, which claims that “for us this creates a new political space for 
class struggle and for the defense of the interests of workers and democracy”39 
and employs it to accuse Marxism of holism. Holism, at least in its very strong 
form, means that an ideology’s unit of operation is not the individual but supra-
individual indivisible social groups, endowed with their own interests and 
purposes a. Moreover, according to this view, one’s belonging to such a group 
is based on one or more of a person’s objective characteristics such as skin 
color or placement in a social structure40  
The next paragraph presents another criticism that Volacu raises against the 
European left’s manifesto. After having previously claimed that distributive justice 
should include a space for individual responsibility, Volacu concludes that because 
Marxism is a holist ideology, it denies this value. It is yet unclear if, for Volacu, the 
responsibility-denial characteristic of Marxism is based on its presumed holism or if 
he ushers in the second great accusation leveled against Marxism: teleological 
determinism. According to this claim, Marxism denies individual responsibility 
because it contains a very strict theory of history according to which this operates 
according to iron laws eventually leading to communism41. 
I do not claim that teleological determinism and holism have not been 
characteristics of the thinking of many Marxist authors. One can only see the 
example of Gyorgy Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness to see how these 
two strains of thought have been combined. I have argued elsewhere that 
according to Lukacs, the concept of class is an indivisible whole, connected by 
a common “class consciousness”, understood as correct behavior given one’s 
objective placement in the relations of production coupled with the 
understanding of the unchangeable nature of historical laws42. Marx himself 
was ambiguous on the issue, as many times his use of terms and lack of 
clarification leaves much to be desired. 
Claiming that the Manifesto of the Party of the European Left is a holist 
and maybe teleological determinist document is a difficult argument to accept 
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  European Left Party Manifesto, http://www.european-left.org/propos-de-la-ge/documents, 
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as it excludes relevant elements from those present in the document. The 
manifesto comprises a wide range of values and goals, including the rejection of 
US “hegemony”, a pro-global south approach, and a rejection of militarism, an 
avowal of social and economic rights (anathema to orthodox Marxists), a 
refusal of militarism and an ambiguous position on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Thus, the ELP platform could be maximally called a democratic 
socialist document. As a political ideology, I would find it most akin to left-
wing Rawlsianism as defended by O’Neill, Penny and Samuel Arnold43. 
Having cleared the way and critiqued Volacu’s textual construal of 
communism, I will proceed by offering his view the benefit of the doubt, 
presenting it in its best possible form and then providing rejections of the 
arguments presented. I claim and have elsewhere argued44 that Marx’s opus is 
an ambiguous mass where conflicting texts make the formulation of a Marxist 
theory of justice nearly impossible. Thus, while the text on which Volacu relies 
to describe communist ideology is nothing but a plea for democratic socialism, 
his critiques tap into several deep-rooted and well-argued views. 
A plethora of arguments against normative Marxism have been 
conceived throughout the literature: 
• Marxism is a totalitarian ideology as it is holist and determinist. This 
view, which Volacu taps into, is a hindsight-based reading of Marx’s 
original texts: imputing on them the understanding provided by 
subsequent generations of communist revolutionaries which became 
the official legitimating doctrine of the Eastern European communist 
parties. The main authors who proceed on this track and have 
generated this canonical reading are Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, 
Leszek Kolakowski and Robert C. Tucker45.  
• Marxism is nothing but a descriptive/analytical tool. It can explain and 
attempt (while failing to) predict, but says nothing perceptive. It is 
mostly a theory of history or a sociological theory. Moreover, its 
price/value distinction has been one of the worst forms of distortion of 
economic theory. 
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• Marxism is morally relativist as it argues that consciousness depends 
on social class and historical period. It makes no universal moral 
claims46  
• Marxism’s normative evaluations are either 1: internal critiques of 
capitalism (arguing that capitalism fails to live up to its own normative 
standards)47 and/or 2. made from the perspective of a society beyond 
justice, where the circumstances of justice would disappear48 
• Even giving Marx’s texts their best interpretation, no coherent theory can 
be drawn out of them, to include at least a defensible principle of justice. 
A detailed rejection of all these critiques is impossible in the short space 
provided by this article. The following counter-arguments to those presented 
above have been brought: 
• Marxism is neither holist nor determinist. It has a theory of history, 
but this does not impose “iron laws”. Its supposedly holist concepts 
(class, proletariat), can be offered non-holist readings49  
• It is true that Marxism offers mostly analyses and prediction, but it 
also contains normative evaluations of working class conditions in 
XVIIIth and XIXth century Britain. It strongly condemns the 
immiseration of the proletariat50. 
• Marx also makes moral evaluations of capitalism. He does 
normative philosophy malgre lui (despite himself)51. 
• Marx rejects capitalism as a whole and he could not have simply 
critiqued it based on its own theories of justice. Only a wrong 
interpretation of Marx’s texts sees communism as beyond justice. It 
is a society governed by the needs principle (From each according to 
his ability, to each according to his needs), provided with a 
reasonable interpretation of needs52. 
• Several authors have attempted to build Marxian theories of justice, 
either based on a strict egalitarianism, or on a form of self-ownership 
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or on some variation of self-determination or a “Marxian-Liberal” 
original position, where the coercive nature of private property is 
taken into account by the deliberators53. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The article presented a critique of Alexandru Volacu’s comparison of 
distributive justice with several political ideologies. It has provided arguments 
for distinguishing between theories of distributive justice and the concept itself, 
seen as a distinct field of philosophical investigation. Thus, rather than 
comparing the concept of distributive justice with different political ideologies, 
the article pleads for linking individual theories with their political counterparts. 
It proposes a connection between i.e. social-democracy and mainstream 
Rawlsianism and left-wing Rawlsianism and democratic socialism. Other such 
connections are left to be investigated in further work.  
Then, the article separated debates on political authority and obligation 
from those on distributive justice by using a metaphor of ponds populated by 
different fish. Thus, the political authority pond is filled with different theories 
than the distributive justice one. Anarchism properly belongs in the political 
authority “pond” where its main competitors are theories which attempt to 
ground moral obligations to obey the law.  
Finally, the article generated three principles of acceptable restriction of 
the main tenets of a political ideology and employs them to argue that Volacu’s 
construal of socialism in the European Left Party’s manifesto is simplistic and 
unjustified. While arguing against his view, I also maintain that Volacu should 
be given the benefit of the doubt as the main trend of interpretation of Marxist 
literature has favored such a result. To argue for this, the article presented a 
necessarily extremely brief overview of debates in the literature on interpreting 
the works of Karl Marx.  
Due to the necessity to be brief as well as to my relatively limited knowledge 
on the main tenets of other political ideologies, I do not attempt to establish 
connections between these and theories of distributive justice here. Yet, I 
conclude by firmly holding on to the view that, to the greatest extent possible, 
ideologies should be compared to individual theories of distributive justice. 
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